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ABSTRACT
The technology used in drones is similar or identical across drone types and components,
with many common risks and opportunities. The purpose of this study is to enhance the risk
assessment procedures for Drone as a Service (DaaS) capabilities. STRIDE is an acronym
that includes the following security risks: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information
Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privileges. The paper presents a modified
STRIDE threat model and prioritizes its desired properties (i.e., authenticity, integrity,
non-reputability, confidentiality, availability, and authorization) to generate an appropriate
DaaS threat model. To this end, the proposed DIREST threat model better meets the
overall security assessment needs of DaaS. Moreover, this paper discusses the security risks
of drones, identifies best practices for security assessment, and proposes a novel software
update mechanism for drones during their operations. We explore the best practices related
to drone penetration testing, including an effective methodology to maintain the continuity
of drone operations, particularly drones used for emergency, safety, and rescue operations.
Moreover, this research raises awareness of DaaS and drone operation in general as well as in
the forensic science community due to its focus on the importance of securely operated drones
for first responders. Furthermore, we address various aspects of security concerns, including
data transmission, software restrictions, and embedded system-related events. In order to
propose a security assessment for drones, we incorporate digital forensics and penetration
testing techniques related to drone operations. Our results show that the proposed threat
model enhances the security of flying devices and provides consistency in digital forensic
procedures. This work introduces modifications to the STRIDE threat model based on the
current literature, drone images provided by the NIST program, and a firmware static analysis
of a zino hubsan brand drone.
Keywords: UAV Security, Drone as a Service, Daas, Drone Forensic, Penetration testing,
Firmware Analysis, Threat Modeling
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1. INTRODUCTION
Drone as a Service (DaaS) adoption and use
has been rapidly increasing in the professional
and commercial sectors Buchholz & Richter
(2019). As Figure 1 shows, it is estimated to
be approximately 267,900 drones in use by
professional sectors by 2025. The assessment
and mitigation of software-related risks are
essential to support the effective operational
adoption of DaaS.
Firmware (i.e., low-level software) and em-
bedded systems (i.e., high-level software)
are omnipresent in most emerging technolo-
gies such as the Internet of Things (IoT),
robotics, drones, 3-D printing, virtual reality,
etc. These types of devices require contin-
uous security testing to plug vulnerabilities
Costin et al. (2014).
Firmware analysis and penetration testing
of embedded devices are crucial in most tech-
nologies, making firmware security an essen-
tial factor, particularly in emerging devices
such as drones. We address various aspects
of security assessments conducted on several
drones used by safety and rescue organiza-
tions. Our work focuses on the analysis of
firmware to determine security vulnerabilities
or misconfiguration that could expose threats
to the activity of drones, software restrictions
that could limit the operation of drones such
as no-fly-zone (NFZ), and operational com-
munication commands. Alternatively, other
security risks could relate to the data architec-
ture of flying devices. Threats such as remote
access to the drone, mid-flight attack, or re-
mote shut down during operation Valente &
Cardenas (2017). The examination of the
system architecture for unmanned aerial ve-
hicles (UAVs) is an essential step to better
address these security threats.
Another aim is to revise the STRIDE
threat model and prioritize its desired
properties (i.e., authenticity, integrity, non-
reputability, confidentiality, availability, and
authorization) to generate an appropriate
DaaS threat model. STRIDE stands for se-
curity risks, namely, spoofing, tampering, re-
pudiation, information disclosure, denial of
service, and elevation of privileges. To this
end, the DIREST threat model better meets
the overall security assessment needs of DaaS.
Moreover, this research raises awareness of
DaaS and drone operations in general as well
as in the forensic science community due to
its focus on the importance of securely oper-
ated drones for first responders.
The analysis in this work is based on secu-
rity measures and metrics such as the open
web application security project of IoT Top
10 Miessler & Smith (2018), the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 2400,
standards for Small Unmanned Aircraft Sys-
tems (sUAS) used for public safety operations
NFPA (2019), and the national institute of
standards and technology (NIST) security
guidelines Initiative (2012).
In this paper, we use drone images pro-
vided by the NIST program for drone foren-
sics NIST: Drone Data Set (n.d.) to reverse
engineer specific files in the interest of con-
fidentiality of data such as flight logs en-
cryption. Also, we conduct firmware anal-
ysis on the latest firmware publicly avail-
able by drone manufacturers. To the best
Figure 1. Market Growth of Drone as a Ser-
vice Buchholz & Richter (2019)
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of our knowledge, the incorporation between
reverse engineering techniques on log files and
firmware analysis has not been addressed by
researchers; therefore, we concentrate on pro-
viding reliable measures and techniques in
order to keep DaaS as operationally secure
and resilient as possible.
Drone vulnerability is an emerging threat
to the security field as the adoption of DaaS
is going to impact the society as an invest-
ment into the drone space continues to grow.
Drone adopters include operators in the fields
of defense, emergency response, healthcare,
agriculture, and transportation.
1.1 Contributions of the Paper
In this paper, we address security challenges
related to the use of drones for first respon-
ders. The contributions of this paper are:
• We use various technical methods (i.e.,
penetration testing and reverse engineer-
ing) to address vulnerabilities that could
be a threat to the operation of flying de-
vices based on well-known security con-
trols related to IoT devices.
• We present security controls related to
the use of drones based on experimenta-
tion and a review of recent drone attacks.
• We propose the DIREST threat model-
ing process to enhance five aspects of
DaaS security, including confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and safety.
1.2 Organization of the Paper
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we discuss the previous work carried
out on simulated and actual unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) hacking incidents, UAV inci-
dent response, and DaaS potential security
threats. Section 3 addresses the approach we
use to propose a threat modeling framework
for DaaS. Section 4 presents a summary of
our findings based on a literature review sur-
vey, technical experiments on Zeno Husban
brand drone firmware, and a revisit of the
STRIDE threat model. Finally, we conclude




The unprecedented outbreak of Coronavirus
Disease-2019 (COVID-19) has boosted the
implementation of drone technologies among
different sectors. The integration of ad-
vanced technologies (e.g., artificial intelli-
gence, networking, blockchain, and beyond
visual line of sight Smoker et al. (n.d.);
Chamola et al. (2020) has enabled DaaS busi-
nesses to utilize drone technology to respond
to COVID-19 pandemic through numerous
applications. Flying devices play an impor-
tant role in government announcements, lo-
gistics services, detection, and monitoring
Ruiz Estrada (2020). Alternatively, no stan-
dard security measures have been formulated
to operate drones as secure as possible. Re-
cently, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security is concerned about a potential risk
from data collected by drones via cloud ser-
vices Shortell (2019). Securing embedded de-
vices requires manufactures to prevent access
to software related data. Researchers in Wat-
son & Dehghantanha (2016) suggested that
developers of emerging technologies including
drones should consider provocations faced by
digital forensic practitioners when examining
these devices. Architecture and implemen-
tation of IoT devices generate new security
risks such as access to the device, mainte-
nance, and software-update Van Oorschot &
Smith (2019).
In our work, we take these security issues
into consideration to intensify the challenges
related to DaaS security. In Sections 2.1, 2.2,
and 2.3, we discuss previous work related to
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general UAV security threats, UAV Incident
Response, and potential security threats to
DaaS, respectively.
2.1 Simulated and Actual UAV
Hacking Incidents
A recent survey demonstrated a fair amount
of simulated and actual cyberattacks on
UAVs, discussing different vulnerabilities that
targeted drones. The authors have summa-
rized reported cyberattack incidents on both
large and small size drones, where small size
drones have experienced GPS jamming as an
actual cyber incident; however, small UAVs
are vulnerable to many other cyberattacks
such as data leakage in communication proto-
cols, and remote hijacking Krishna & Murphy
(2017). Another work discussed the worthi-
ness of drone security assessment, and con-
ducted a security analysis on DJI Phantom
3 and drew the importance of software vul-
nerabilities that could lead to stealing sensi-
tive data. Researchers recommended security
measures such as a requirement to change
passwords on the first use of the drone; pre-
vent unauthorized access to the file system
as a root user, and provide security for open
ports while a UAV is in operation Trujano
et al. (2016); F. Salamh et al. (2021). As we
are targeting the security of DaaS, the study
of interdiction attacks is important. A study
on the security of DaaS cyber-physical formu-
lated a zero-sum network ban game to avoid
the interception of UAV by attackers when
the drone is on a delivery mission Sanjab et
al. (2017). This indicates that the adoption
of DaaS needs a well defined and classified
threat modeling system to achieve secure mit-
igation strategies which enhance the incident
response plan.
2.2 UAV Incident Response
A recent research discussed drone incident re-
sponse plans. It illustrated the importance of
a ‘lessons learned’ phase where vulnerabilities
and security threats are identified to improve
the mitigation strategies (F. Salamh et al.,
2019). On the other hand, a novel drone
forensic investigation process has been intro-
duced in F. E. Salamh et al. (2019), which
provides an extra layer to the technical proce-
dure of responding to drone hacking incidents.
Works related to drone forensics can be ben-
eficial in a post-incident stage; however, this
paper focuses on the pre-incident stage to
enhance the security of flying devices. A com-
prehensive work in Prathap & Rachumallu
(2013) illustrated the penetration testing of
electronic control units (ECUs) in vehicles.
ECUs are known as embedded systems to
operate a device in an automated approach.
For instance, ECUs are effective for vehicles
to perform actions requested through differ-
ent sensors; however, UAVs use multiple con-
trol systems to perform specific actions (e.g.,
an Electronic Speed Controller), which deals
with the motor speed and directions.
2.3 DaaS Potential Security
Threats
Lack of research in the area of DaaS security
assessment creates challenges for the future of
emerging technologies. The advancement of
technology is moving very fast. This requires
scientists to focus investigative research on
sociotechnical systems (STS) development.
Adopting new technologies as a solution to
current problems does not prevent the occur-
rence of significant issues; therefore, in this
research, we carefully address this challenge
by combining all principals of STS. For in-
stance, Noy et al. (2018) discuss challenges
posed in the cyber-physical realm, including
UAVs. Researchers have identified the lack
of research on the implications of dealing
with complex systems issues from a security
lens as a potential safety threat, and they
have proposed two principles of STS. These
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proposed core principles are provided to en-
hance the overall security of systems. This
would increase the overall functionality of the
systems when they are connected through hi-
erarchical feedback control loops, considering
all subsystems.
We consider the STRIDE threat model to
support our security risk assessment model
for emerging technologies, specifically DaaS,
because we believe an in-depth technical anal-
ysis should be conducted to enhance the the-
oretical methodology; while the proposed
model could be implemented on other tech-
nologies, however, measuring the risk as-
sessment of other emerging technologies are
out of the scope of our research. STRIDE
Shostack (2008) is a well-known threat model
that is used in this research to study potential
threats of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs).
Drone GPS spoofing controls the function-
ality of flying devices, and there are several
incidents related to maldrone and GPS spoof-
ing attacks for weaponizing purposes.
A proof of concept has been presented in
Braga (2015), where a programmed drone
controls another drone and hacks into it. Vul-
nerabilities such as unnecessary open ports
increase the risk of drones being hacked. In
terms of using drones as a service, it is es-
sential to avoid data being tampered with,
including, for instance, using drones for crime
scene mapping in the performance of public
safety services Mendis et al. (2016). One
aspect of data tampering on drones is the
modification of sensitive data such as secure
features implemented on the drone’s firmware.
Modification to the NFZ is out of the scope of
this research; however, the ability to modify
such a restriction feature poses challenges to
the environment of DaaS.
The concentration of this paper is to en-
hance the overall security of DaaS implemen-
tation. A proof of concept design for data
tampering has been presented in (F. Salamh
et al., 2019), where it is possible for an at-
tacker to modify metadata that is critical to
the digital forensic community. Repudiation
in DaaS mainly deals with performing unau-
thorized access and being able to deny the
perpetration of actions He et al. (2017); Bal-
dini et al. (2013); Humphreys et al. (2008).
Researchers discussed issues related to in-
formation disclosure by initiating an eaves-
dropping attack. An experimental Denial of
Service (DoS) attack was presented in Vascon-
celos et al. (2016). The DoS attack performed
on an AR drone 2.0 illustrated the malfunc-
tioning of live streaming data using tools such
as lioic, netwox, and hping3. A privilege esca-
lation vulnerability such as the nvidia tegra
processor, which is known as the cold-boot
attack Bhatia (2019), illustrates the impact
and threat that DaaS implementers need to
address, preferably through a program of se-
cure patch management. The complexity of
drone technology and its system components
raise a security issue when it comes to the
protection of these systems against attackers.
A lack of proper security assessment leads
to the rapid diffusion of DaaS. For instance,
these flying devices rely on GPS technol-
ogy, which can be spoofed by an attack, po-
tentially resulting in the weaponization of
a drone. Researchers classified GPS spoof-
ing attacks as the main security threat to
flying devices INFOSEC (2013); therefore,
in this research, we take the severity level
of security threats into consideration. GPS
spoofing impacts the security component of
drone operations, namely availability Choud-
hary et al. (2018) and might lead to data
being tempered. This type of attack imposes
anti-forensic challenges to the drone forensic
investigation process (F. Salamh et al., 2019).
An experimental evaluation of GPS spoofing
was performed on a Hornet Mini civil UAV,
resulting in digitally dispositioning the UAV
geo-location of approximately 0.62 kilometers
Shepard et al. (2012). UAVs cyber threats in-
clude GPS spoofing, DoS, hardware/software
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trojans, and unauthorized access to telemet-
ric signals. Researchers in Altawy & Youssef
(2016) proposed security requirements to mit-
igate these by enhancing the encryption of
telemetric channels, regular system update,
and system monitoring.
Another security threat to DaaS is a mal-
ware attack Storm (2015), where a drone can
be injected with an exploit targeting a specific
backdoor in the system to take full control.
Firmware is considered to be a major risk to
drones, mainly when companies aim for low-
cost maintenance Kvarda et al. (2017). The
traditional process of firmware updates has
several unsecured processes and steps, where
a vulnerability has been identified, and a man-
ufacturer distributes the updated firmware
over the internet to let customers update
their drones. In this case, attackers have
easy access to the entire firmware image file,
which can be reverse-engineered. In Atmel
(2013), researchers presented the flow pro-
cess of firmware update security as shown in
Figure 2.
A study in Egham (2013) emphasizes on
the importance of updating firmware re-
motely, Jurkovic & Sruk (2014) researchers
proposed an updated solution for firmware
update transmitted over a transport layer
security with a unique certificate. In our
research, we particularly study the security
aspect of firmware updates associated with
DaaS. We look into strategies that could en-
hance the secure firmware update to avoid
operational and security risks. An introduc-
tion to the three update strategies has been
presented in Jurkovic & Sruk (2014). The
presenters demonstrated a live demo where
they updated the camera’s software while the
drone was operational and airborne Imreh
(2017). Software update while in mid-flight
is crucial to the field of DaaS. Suppose a sig-
nificant bug was discovered while thousands
of drones are on an active delivery mission.
This indicates the need for a live software
update with zero-downtime, as presented in
Jurkovic & Sruk (2014); Imreh (2017). The
presented system relies on creating smart con-
tracts for a new firmware update, which is
distributed via top-reputation AVs Baza et
al. (2019). In DaaS, the case is entirely dif-
ferent since we can not implement drone to
drone communication, which might result in
more risks; therefore, our proposed firmware
update strategy combines the work presented
by Jurkovic & Sruk (2014); Imreh (2017);
Baza et al. (2019) to match the objectives of
the DIREST threat model proposed in this
research.
3. METHODOLOGY
The technical experiment of this research in-
volves different classes within the firmware.
The firmware is the brain of flying devices
in terms of effective operation in the sky;
therefore, we conduct security testing on zino
hubsan brand firmware and drone images
to generate a threat modeling process that
could mitigate security threats to drone op-
erations, especially when adopting the tech-
nology as a service. For instance, a built-in
camera attached to the drone has firmware
that should be securely programmed to avoid
unauthorized access to media files and data
tampering. Safety and reliability of flying
devices are linked to the firmware security.
These products should have a constant secu-
rity scanning of embedded systems as drones
operate on built-in software.
Firmware can be found and downloaded
through the vendor’s website, which is not
recommended as the newly released update
can be distributed by attackers using a mod-
ified infected version of the software. For
DaaS, it seems that most well-known compa-
nies have started to avoid public distribution
of firmware; however, this does not effectively
work when it comes to DaaS because it is dif-
ficult to update the system while the drone
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Figure 2. Firmware Update Security Issues Atmel (2013)
engaged in a flight operation. It is crucial
that a drone should be updated in the air
to avoid possible threats. In this paper, we
perform technical analysis (i.e., penetration
testing and reverse engineering) to discover
possible vulnerabilities and misconfigurations
related to the selected firmware. Our analysis
includes decompression of firmware, entropy
analysis, and system fingerprinting (see Sec-
tion 4).
Also, we propose an enhanced DIREST
Threat Model Method (DIREST-TMM),
which is an acronym of DoS, Information
disclosure, Repudiation, Escalation of privi-
lege, Spoofing GPS protocol, and Tampering
as a result of a new prioritized view of the
STRIDE threat model will be used as a
methodology to deal with UASs and propose
a developed threat model for DaaS. We de-
veloped the DIREST threat model taking the




The scope of this paper is to integrate most
well-known security standards and frame-
works to propose a comprehensive threat
model based on the following measures:
• A literature review of recent incidents
related to drones.
• Technical experiments on a Zeno Hubsan
firmware.
• A revisit to the STRIDE threat model
and a proposed enhancement that is a
better fit for DaaS.
• A proposed risk assessment framework
specifically for DaaS.
Since we covered most of the drone cyber
incidents in Section 2, it is essential to vali-
date the security weaknesses of drones and
tackle the studied issue from technical and
theoretical sides.
4.1 Technical experiment on
Zeno Hubsan drone
Firmware analysis is a crucial pen-testing
technique to avoid security holes that can
be exploited as a vulnerability. Penetration
testers capture the firmware of the device
through packet sniffing, reverse engineering
c© 2021 JDFSL Page 7
JDFSL 2021 THREAT MODELING FOR DRONE AS A SERVICE
the mobile app, or dumping it from the flash
storage chip. These are commonly used meth-
ods for testing for software security; however,
recently, some well-known drone companies
have deployed over-the-air (OTA) firmware
updates. OTA updates are a good practice to
update software bugs automatically. Unfor-
tunately, manufacturers focus on the lowest
cost production and firmware update mecha-
nisms, which often creates a major security
issue. Continuous update to the firmware
of a flying device is important as the device
heavily relies on programmed features that
can be vulnerable anytime.
A proof of concept (PoC) in (F. Salamh
et al., 2019) illustrated a security issue re-
lated to a software bug that failed to encrypt
flight logs while on flight mode, which leaves
the flight logs in plaintext format. Further-
more, we unpack and reverse engineer three
firmware assemblies belonging to the men-
tioned UAV in this research. The main goal
of the technical experiment is not to suggest
additional techniques in firmware analysis;
however, we do check the security strategy
used in implementing the firmware. The un-
packing process starts using binwalk on Kali
Linux to get a deeper understanding of the
firmware heterogeneity. The presented tech-
nical PoC on the firmware update strategy
in Imreh (2017); Baza et al. (2019) used a
hand over update strategy as shown in Fig-
ure 3. The handover update strategy has a
zero-downtime update as it starts with down-
loading the new firmware image while the old
firmware is active. The old firmware image is
rendered inactive when the new firmware up-
date is completed and notifies the old version.
This strategy reduces the risk of relying on
client-side updates and provides a faster and
more efficient approach to fix vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we conduct a static analysis
of zino hubsan firmware as a proof of concept,
which will enhance the overall threat model
of flying devices. We analyze the code for
known vulnerabilities; measure entropy level,
and look into the data transmission method-
ology. Our purpose is to have both technical
and theoretical aspects in place, using best
practices. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the decom-
pression and unpacking of the firmware. We
looked at compressed files, which include the
kernel binary image. Running the ‘strings’
command provides more details about the
readable text inside the image.
Figure 6 illustrates the first ten readable
strings, which include the version of the Linux
operating system. This information can be
helpful and harmful at the same time. Attack-
ers might get an advantage by fingerprinting
the firmware and target these devices. We
looked at vulnerability databases to deter-
mine the type of attacks associated with this
particular version of the Linux operating sys-
tem. As shown in Figure 7, this version is
highly affected by DoS (43.8%) with 192 vul-
nerabilities during the last five years. This
presents the lessons to be learned by DaaS
adopters. All systems should be up to date
to avoid risks. From our analysis, we found
that the firmware is updated; however, the
version of the operating system is about three
years old.
Entropy analysis is a technique used to
measure data randomness of a binary file.
The technique was derived by Claude Shan-





A computation of entropy measurement
was performed on four training sets including
plaintext files. The expected 99.99% confi-
dence interval (CI) for encrypted or packed
data ranges from 4.941 - 6.369, 6.677 - 7.267,
and 7.174 - 7.312 for native, packed, en-
crypted executables, respectively Lyda &
Hamrock (2007). Alternatively, the highest
99.99% CI on plaintext files on all training
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Figure 3. Firmware hand over update strategy Baza et al. (2019)
sets was 5.030, indicating that an entropy
above 0.6 is likely to be compressed or en-
crypted. We delved into a static analysis of
the software code and the entropy level of
the Zino firmware, as shown in Figure 8. The
performed entropy analysis illustrates a low
level of encryption or compression in some
regions of the binary file. These blind spots
can divulge sensitive confidential information
related to the firmware content.
4.2 A revisit to the STRIDE
threat model and a
proposed enhancement
that fits DaaS
Earlier, we provided a piece of introductory
information on the STRIDE threat model. In
this paper, we build a threat model based on
the STRIDE acronym; however, we named
it the DIREST threat model because it is
based on the priority of each risk factor. On
the other hand, we carefully considered the
hardware and software components of drones
in three instances when data is at rest, in
motion, and in use. DaaS organizations must
achieve appropriate security levels and pro-
tections for these categories. Data at rest con-
tains data stored within the firmware, mem-
ory cards, and logs. The security of these
components is important to avoid data being
tampered with or stolen. More importantly,
for the transmitted data, drones have differ-
ent communication protocols, and it is very
important to secure this transmitted data
properly. For instance, (F. Salamh et al.,
2019) presented a vulnerability in the storage
mechanism of Typhoon H drone, where it
does not encrypt live streaming data. Simi-
larly, with data in use, most of the activities
between the server and the client should be
secured. When it comes to drone security for
DaaS, we prioritize DoS as the most critical
risk factor because disruption of drone service
is an issue for most companies that adopt
drones. Second, Information Disclosure is
critical because these devices are equipped
with sensitive customer information, which
might result in cyber profiling and identity
theft. Repudiation is considered as the third
risk factor in our model. It has been proven
in (F. Salamh et al., 2019) that the integrity
of data is a concern when dealing with flying
devices. The reason is that they operate on
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Figure 4. Decompression of Firmware
Figure 5. Unpacking compressed data
Figure 6. Human Readable Strings in Kernel Image
Figure 7. Vulnerabilities Associated with
Linux V.3.10.101
different communication protocols and even
multiple system components; therefore, it is
important to properly certify these digital
communications and consider it as a risk fac-
tor that might lead to other security risks.
In Section 4 we present a technical proof
using a reverse engineering technique that
touches on issues related to security best prac-
Figure 8. Entropy Analysis of Firmware
tices and software update mechanisms. For
instance, when we unpacked the firmware
(see Figures 4, 5, and 6) we discovered that
the operating system was seriously outdated
while the firmware was the latest version.
Furthermore, the old-fashioned style of pro-
viding firmware to be downloaded from the
vendor website is considered a notable threat,
which could lead to a targeted cyber attack on
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these devices. GPS Spoofing is categorized as
a level five threat because it relates to coun-
termeasures that should be secured in the
first four risk factors, including, for example,
the hardening of navigation systems. The
Tampering risk factor is key since it is crucial
for DaaS to be able to carry reliable data and
be tamper-proof to comply with the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) drone oper-
ator guidelines. Our proposed threat model
supports the design of a comprehensive risk
assessment framework for DaaS.
4.3 Proposed DIREST Threat
Model Method
(DIREST-TMM)
The model proposed in this paper (see Fig-
ure 9) concentrates on the prioritization of
security threats. In regard to DaaS, the avail-
ability of the service is a primary and driving
principle of the model. Mitigating DoS at-
tacks to DaaS is crucial to avoid service dis-
ruption. DIREST-TMM is categorized in an
ascending order based on the level of security
risk. We determine the security threats based
on recent publications related to drone cyber
attacks and technical experiments conducted
in this research. Next in priority comes the
information disclosure element, which should
be assessed on different stages of data stor-
age, including data at rest, data in motion,
and data in use. These three types of data
should be transmitted and kept securely by
implementing proper encryption mechanisms.
5. SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS
Our study and the experimentation com-
pleted in this research has led to a novel risk
assessment framework that should be imple-
mented in most DaaS organizations. Cur-
rently, the hype of drones as a service is
rapidly increasing without any security as-
Figure 9. DIREST-TMM
sessment plans. Moreover, most research ef-
forts lack threat modeling and threat analy-
sis tailored for drone operations. We studied
software/hardware-related security threats,
weak communication protocols, and data flow
in transmitting data to generate a standard
risk assessment framework.
5.1 Proposed risk assessment
framework designed
for DaaS
We took the OWASP IoT top 10 list Miessler
& Smith (2018) into consideration to develop
this framework, which is designed for flying
devices with no restrictions on the differ-
ent automation levels. Ultimately, securing
drones from cyber threats are crucial. We
developed a comprehensive framework that
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enables DaaS organizations to consider secu-
rity risks, particularly since when the number
of flying drones increases, there will be an
increase in non-cyber threats; however, dis-
cussing non-digital risks is out of scope for
this paper. Hence, we focus only on digital
risks. As shown in Figure 10, our proposed
threat assessment framework enables orga-
nizations to adopt drone technology more
safely. We categorize the threat assessment
framework based on four phases (i.e., assess,
identify, evaluate, and treat) and each phase
deals with a specific category of risk that
includes
1. Assessing application and link risks,
2. Identifying accessibility risks,
3. Evaluating perceptional risks, and
4. Treating data security risks.
This is done based on the data flow archi-
tecture of flying devices illustrated in Figure
10, which illustrates the proposed DIREST-
TMM that comprises sixteen risk factors re-
lated to the security measurement of DaaS
operation. For instance, we recommend as-
sessing application and link risks by securing
streaming data and connected communica-
tion protocols; however, to achieve secure
operation and maintenance, our proposed
framework insists on identifying accessibility
risks (i.e., system monitoring, update man-
agement, secure ecosystem, secure network
services and credentials).
DaaS businesses must evaluate percep-
tional risks such as autonomy, human trust,
and efficiency. Doing so would target a bet-
ter measurement and evaluation – lastly, the
treatment of data security risks. The adop-
tion and deployment of secure cryptography
of data would enhance data governance and
reduce potential privacy issues.
Security risks of these devices come from
weak communication protocols, unpatched
software, and the use of unneeded network
services. In our framework, we consider all
these aspects, mainly where application and
data link risks dictate measures to prevent
data leakage while in motion; therefore, weak
communication protocols and insecure data
streaming should be well managed to avoid
leakage of these data. Researchers (F. Salamh
et al., 2019; F. E. Salamh et al., 2019) demon-
strated how data transition can be an issue
to drone operators, mainly when drones are
used as a collector of and collection point
for sensitive data. Furthermore, it is crucial
for DaaS implementers to manage the risk of
accessibility to drone devices.
The management of encryption and net-
work services deployed on drones are essential
to operate and maintain flying devices se-
curely. Soon, drones will carry and transmit
invaluable data. For instance, data leakage
of gas thermal imaging or any other critical
infrastructures becomes a potential imme-
diate critical infrastructure risk. With the
increased advancements in drone technology,
we will see more incidents related to data or
service disruption. The previous work dis-
cussed in this research indicates that hacking
drones is not a significant challenge because
of the weak software and communication pro-
tocols used. Furthermore, most of the drone
adopters are not concentrating on the security
of DaaS, focusing instead on the advancement
of the technology and functionality of these
devices. That is why we classified risk Percep-
tion as an important factor in our proposed
threat assessment framework.
Risk Perception deals with the safety and
security of sensors and actuators, targeting
a higher maturity level of measurement and
evaluation. From a human perspective, hu-
man trust in automation is still in its early
stages, which is a function of the auton-
omy and efficiency of insecure technologies.
From a technology perspective, data and geo-
location pose a threat to these flying devices.
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Figure 11. Drone Data Flow and Components
It is a balanced equation when sensors and
actuators are performed securely, resulting in
an increase in safety and efficiency through
measurement and evaluation of perceptional
risks.
Data risks are covered in most of the pre-
vious work; however, in this last category, we
insist on the importance of adopting secure
encryption mechanisms based on well-known
standards along with data policy for each
DaaS provider. Having clear policies on data
transmission will enhance the overall gover-
nance and management of data risks. Also,
the methodology of data backup used for
drones plays an important role in governing
data risk. In Figure 11, we illustrate the
data flow and the important components of a
drone. These components along with cloud-
based data storage and transmission of data
should be assessed using the proposed threat
assessment framework to improve the overall
security of drones.
6. CONCLUSION
Companies offering DaaS are growing rapidly
without taking proper security measures into
consideration. COVID-19 pandemic played
an important role in testing drone technolo-
gies and could be considered as an excel-
lent excellent opportunity for researchers to
evaluate drone security from different angles.
We discussed various technical techniques
that could potentially be security threats
to drone operations.The proposed DIREST
threat model and threat assessment frame-
work will aid in improving the security of
these flying devices. In this research, we
have demonstrated a number of security vul-
nerabilities and presented the weaknesses of
drone systems. Also, we discussed the previ-
ous work related to drone hacking incidents
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due to weak communication protocols and
network services ensuring a proper security
measure of drone operations. DIREST threat
model comprehensively appraised measures
such as confidentiality, integrity, availability,
and safety to satisfy minimum security re-
quirements related to drone operations.
As for future work, we plan to develop
an operational drone security center where
all software components and communication
protocols are automatically scanned for vul-
nerabilities. This would enhance the adop-
tion of DaaS and the secure monitoring of
drones on both critical and noncritical mis-
sions. Regarding the automation of secure
firmware updates, we would like to work on
integrating the proposed technology in this
research with block-chain technology to en-
hance the integrity and authentication of scal-
able firmware update distribution on a large
scale.
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